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Delimiting Antitrust
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON*
Both the law and economics of antitrust have undergone significant change
in the past twenty years. The expansive antitrust attitudes and enforcement
practices of the 1960s have been delimited. Greater respect for economies
and the subtleties of market processes and competition have developed. Ef-
forts to focus antitrust policy and further delimit antitrust enforcement are in
progress. Although I am sympathetic with these general purposes, I am also
concerned with overshooting.
Part I of this article examines the changing attitudes toward antitrust and
distinguishes between inflexible legal rule and more flexible legal process ba-
ses for delimiting enforcement. Part II assesses the "filters" approach to an-
titrust proposed by Frank Easterbrook,1 parts of which have been embraced
by the enforcement agencies and the courts. Part III sketches the scope of
strategic behavior. Several recent cases in which filter and strategic behavior
issues arise are discussed in part IV.
I. THE LOGIC OF ANTITRUST
Antitrust is a complicated subject and is usefully informed by several
points of view. In the following paragraphs I discuss and distinguish eco-
nomic and legal logic and argue that antitrust is best analyzed by regarding
"economizing" as the "main case"-where, in the context of antitrust, the
main case is that factor that is held to be primarily responsible for shaping
and changing the organization of economic activity. I hold that economizing
on production costs but, even more, on transactions costs qualifies for main
case standing.
Once alternative main case hypotheses have been stated and their ramifica-
tions displayed, qualifications of both legal and economic kinds can thereaf-
ter be introduced. Some, however, who ask that their antitrust voices be
heard fail or refuse to state the main case out of which they work. This is a
dereliction (or worse). A pressing need in antitrust is that alternative main
case hypotheses be clearly stated and their ramifications exposed.
* The author is Gordon B. Tweedy Professor of Economics of Law and Organization at Yale
University, on leave as Visiting Professor of Economics and Transamerica Professor of Business
Administration at the University of California, Berkeley.
1. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, The
Limits of Antitrust].
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A. THE ECONOMIC LOGIC
1. Main Case Reasoning
"Monopolizing" and "economizing" are the two leading economic pur-
poses that are used to interpret business behavior. These factors are not mu-
tually exclusive. If, however, one predominates, then it should be regarded
as the main case and the other treated as the exception (rather than on parity
and certainly not as the rule). Deeper understanding will be realized and
needless confusion will be avoided by keeping the main case clearly in mind
and introducing qualifications as and where they are needed.
During the 1960s, monopolizing was thought to be mainly responsible for
nonstandard or unfamiliar business practices. Ronald Coase captured the
prevailing spirit by remarking:
[i]f an economist finds something-a business practice of one sort or an-
other-that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation.
And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of ununderstandable
practices tends to be very large, and the reliance on a monopoly explana-
tion frequent.2
One factor responsible for this monopoly predisposition was the prevailing
practice of describing the firm as a production function whose natural
boundaries were defined by technology. Economic inputs were thus trans-
formed by the production technology into economic outputs; organizational
considerations were effectively suppressed. Efforts to extend the reach of the
firm by merger or by complex contracting practices (vertical restraints, reci-
procity, joint ventures, etc.) were thus presumed to be anticompetitive. 3
Lawyers were willing accomplices. What has come to be referred to as
"creative lawyering ' 4 enjoyed unusual latitude during the 1960s. The stan-
dards for judging an antitrust offense fell so low that respondents not only
made no affirmative case for economies as an antitrust defense but even dis-
claimed economies that were ascribed to a merger by the government. 5 The
2. Coase, Industrial Organization. A Proposal for Research, in POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH
OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 67 (V.R. Fuchs ed. 1972).
3. See generally 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTrrUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15-42, 365-84
(1985) [hereinafter 0. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS].
4. John Shenefield represented that "creative lawyering" could be employed to bring antitrust
suits against conglomerate mergers that did not obviously fall within the scope of the merger stat-
utes. Given the vague language of the statutes and the wide latitude of the case law, imaginative
lawyers would "find a way" to bring such suits. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopolies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1978) (testimony of
John H. Shenefield).
5. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Proctor & Gamble Corp., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). Thus Proctor &
Gamble insisted that its acquisition of Clorox was unobjectionable because the government was
unable to establish definitively that any efficiencies would result:
[The government is unable to prove] any advantages in the procurement or price of raw
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"inhospitality tradition" flourished. 6
This unsatisfactory state of affairs was increasingly criticized during the
1970s. First, the social benefits of efficient resource allocation-to include
the importance of economies as an antitrust defense 7-became much more
widely appreciated. More importantly, the nature of the business firm was
reconceptualized. The older theory of the firm as production function gradu-
ally made way (or gave way) to a theory of the firm in which express allow-
ance was made for transaction costs. Accordingly, the firm was thereafter
described as a governance structure. Factors that contributed to the compar-
ative integrity of contract were thus introduced. Technology was no longer
determinative, and the boundaries of the firm (what to make, what to buy,
how to trade, etc.) now needed to be derived.
This reconceptualization of the business firm together with a demonstra-
tion that economies constituted a meaningful (if not dispositive) antitrust de-
fense across a wide range of pertinent economic circumstances (parameter
values) placed antitrust enforcement under severe strain. Although some
commentators argued that the influence of economic reasoning on antitrust
enforcement was slight,s there is growing agreement that antitrust would not
have been reformed but for the development of new theory. The differences
between the 1968 and the 1982 merger guidelines of the United States De-
materials or in the acquisition or use of needed manufacturing facilities or in the purchase
of bottles or in freight costs .... [IT]here is no proof of any savings in any aspect of
manufacturing. There is no proof that any additional manufacturing facilities would be
usable for the production of Clorox. There is no proof that any combination of manufac-
turing facilities would effect any savings, even if such combination were feasible.
Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1580, 1582
n.5 (1983) (quoting Proctor & Gamble's brief as respondent).
6. Frank Easterbrook characterizes the inhospitality tradition as one in which "judges view each
business practice with suspicion." Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 1, at 4. This
characterization is much too narrow. The entire 1960s enforcement process worked out of this
orientation with only minor exceptions. The prevailing applied price theory orientation within in-
dustrial organization, whereby firms were regarded as production functions and nonstandard con-
tracting was interpreted as an effort to extend the reach of the firm beyond its natural boundaries,
gave succor to the inhospitality tradition. Coase, supra note 2, at 62.
7. Thus suppose one ascribes adverse economic effects to a merger with both market power and
efficiency consequences. One can assess the plausibility of adverse effects by asking (1) what range
of price effects are reasonably attributed to the merger, (2) what range of cost savings are reasonably
attributed to the merger, (3) what is the relevant range of demand elasticities, and (4) what is the
preexisting degree of market power. If for all reasonable parameter values the net allocative effi-
ciency effects are judged positive by applying partial equilibrium welfare apparatus, then the claims
of adverse effect must fail on grounds of implausibility. Harberger, Three Basic Postulates for Ap-
plied Welfare Economics: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. ECON. Lrr. 785 (1971); Williamson, Economies
as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. Rlv. 18 (1968) [hereinafter Wil-
liamson, Economies]; Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. Ray.
699 (1977) [hereinafter Williamson, Economies Revisited].
8. See generally Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. RPv. 1
(1982).
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partment of Justice evidence some of the changes that resulted from the para-
digm shift away from market power (monopolizing) in favor of efficiency
(economizing).
To be sure, antitrust is not innocent of politics;9 however, ideas matter
more in antitrust than in most regulated areas. As one observer noted, "a
genuine scientific revolution has occurred . .. [and] has led to a more
thoughtful and rational approach to antitrust."' 0 Indeed, William Baxter's
forcefulness notwithstanding, "it would have been politically impossible for
... Baxter to have done what he did [as Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust], had there not been an intellectual shift in the underpinnings of
antitrust."1
2. Strategic Behavior
Strategic behavior can take either defensive or offensive forms. The former
involve efforts to protect ill-defined property rights against loss of ap-
propriability. Lest the benefits of an investment or innovation be appropri-
ated by other participants in the vertical chain of supply, firms that originate
an investment or innovation may be induced to make "linking invest-
ments"12 or to integrate (backward, forward, or laterally) into other stages. 13
The object of these investments is defensive, in that, were it not for the haz-
ard of leakage, they would not be undertaken. Albeit sometimes compli-
cated, defensive strategic moves that are designed to deter leakage rarely pose
antitrust problems.' 4
By contrast, offensive strategic behavior is concerned not with leakage in
the vertical contracting process but rather is directed at actual and potential
rivals. It entails efforts by established firms to take up advance positions
and/or respond punitively toward rivals. As discussed below, such behavior
(1) can take a wide variety of forms, some of which are very subtle, and (2) is
often problematic in antitrust respects, especially when the strategies in ques-
tion are focused on a particular rival (or well-defined subset of rivals) or are
exercised in a disciplinary (contingent) fashion. My concern hereafter is with
strategic behavior of this second kind.
A new logic of strategic behavior has been taking shape in the 1980s.
Although much of this work bears on entry barrier arguments that consti-
tuted the centerpiece of the inhospitality tradition, recent work is careful and
9. I return to this issue in part IV below.
10. Frech, Comments on Antitrust Issues, 7 HEALTH ECON. HEALTH SERVICES RES. 263 (1987).
11. Bork, The Rule of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 21, 25 (1985).
12. Heide & John, The Role of Dependence Balancing in Safeguarding Transaction-Specific Assets
in Conventional Channels (forthcoming in Journal of Marketing, 1988).
13. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation, 15 RES. POL'y 285 (1986).
14. Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of Unfair Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON.
REv. 356 (1980).
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does not indicate that monopoly will again be accepted as the main case.
First, while the mere existence of entry barriers was previously thought both
objectionable and unlawful, this noncomparative approach has been sup-
planted by one in which (as an enforcement matter) the relevant test is not
whether entry impediments exist but whether a remedy can be effected with
net social gains. As a result, arguments regarding the mere existence of entry
barriers no longer carry the day. Second, the logic of strategic models is
much more carefully developed with credibility features given special atten-
tion. 15 Third, the structural preconditions-mainly high concentration cou-
pled with severe hurdles to entry-necessary for support of exclusionary or
other anticompetitive effects now are meticulously respected. Because these
conditions are the exception rather than the rule, economizing remains the
main case to which appropriate strategic qualifications are added.
B. THE LEGAL LOGIC
Kenneth Arrow has described the economist as "the guardian of rational-
ity, the ascriber of rationality to others, and the prescriber of rationality to
the social world." 16 The law, however, has needs of its own that are some-
times thought to be poorly served by rationality analysis. If the economist is
the guardian of rationality, many regard the lawyer as the guardian of ad-
ministrability. Judge Stephen Breyer of the First Circuit maintains:
While technical economic discussion helps to inform the antitrust laws,
those cannot precisely replicate the economists' (sometimes conflicting)
views. For, unlike economics, law is an administrative system the effects of
which depend upon the content of rules and precedents only as they are
applied by judges and juries in courts and by lawyers advising their clients.
Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and qualification...
[thus sometimes give way to] the administrative virtues of simplicity. 17
This language is favorably cited by Frank Easterbrook in conjunction with
his proposal to screen out highly problematic antitrust cases by employing a
series of antitrust filters. 18
There are two different approaches to administrability. I refer to the first
of these as the "legal process" approach and the second as the "legal rules"
approach. The main distinction is that the latter works out of economic cer-
titudes-usually, that the relevant economic models are in place and are cor-
15. Credibility issues are discussed in 0. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTrUTIoNs, supra note 3,
at 373-77.
16. K. ARRow, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1974). To be sure, noneconomists also
engage in the rationality dialogue. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68 AM.
ECON. Rnv. 1 (1978). That the economist is the preeminent user and spokesman of rationality
analysis, however, is conceded generally.
17. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (lst Cir. 1983).
18. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 1, at 16-17.
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rectly understood by the antitrust authorities-while the former is much
more tentative. Rather than assert false certitude, the legal process approach
urges that complicated issues of economic organization that are poorly un-
derstood be accorded respect. The object is to move toward a progressively
more informed disposition of the issues as the relevant theory is refined and
implemented, due allowance having been made for the infirmities of the
courts. The immediate object is to discover the relevant tradeoffs implied by
the theory, thereafter to develop an operational framework whereby these
tradeoffs can be assessed.
1. Legal Process
The legal process approach counsels gradualism. Antitrust responsiveness
to new developments in economic theory only occurs with a lag. After all,
economics is subject to fads and fashions, 19 which are best sorted out
through sustained academic critique. Moreover, even those developments
that survive such criticism must be operationalized. Consequently, crude ap-
proximating devices may have to be developed. Derek Bok's discussion of
the enforcement of merger law illustrates these concerns:
Although truth is the preeminent aim of economic study it can only be one
of several goals in law. Lawyers have perhaps not always been explicit
enough in articulating the peculiar qualifications which their institutions
place upon the unbridled pursuit of truth, and this failure may in some
measure explain the irritation with which their handiwork is so often
greeted by even thoughtful economists. This problem cannot be solved,
nor can the economist-critic be placated, by embracing more and more of
the niceties of economic theory into our antitrust proceedings. Unless we
can be certain of the capacity of our legal system to absorb new doctrine,
our attempts to introduce it will only be more ludicrous in failure and more
costly in execution. 20
That antitrust enforcement was not ready in 1968 to absorb economies as
an antitrust defense is probably consonant with Bok's views. That economies
arguments influenced the enforcement process during the 1970s and today
play an even larger role is a gradualist outcome which many consider benefi-
cial.2 ' Arguably, this is the way antitrust enforcement should work.
19. The widespread use of differential risk aversion to explain contractual anomalies in the 1970s
is an illustration.
20. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv.
226, 227-28 (1960).
21. Timothy Muris and I explain the benefits of an economies defense. Muris, The Efficiency
Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 381 (1979); Williamson,
Economies, supra note 7; Williamson, Economies Revisited, supra note 7. For a more cautious view
of the benefits of an economies defense see Fisher & Lande, supra note 5.
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2. Legal Rules
The legal rules approach to antitrust enforcement assumes that the rele-
vant economic theory is already in hand and is adequately understood by the
antitrust authorities. 22 It further holds that the courts have limited ability to
deal with tradeoffs or more sophisticated economic reasoning and that these
conditions are unchanging. A predilection to pronounce simple legal rules
now is characteristic of legal scholars who work out of the legal rules
framework.
For example, several leading legal scholars have advised against an exami-
nation of economies as an antitrust defense or an assessment of the condition
of entry, and have instead favored inelastic legal rules. Consider the
following:
(1) [C]laims of economic efficiency will not justify a course of conduct con-
ferring excessive market power. The objective of maintaining a system of
self-policing markets requires that all such claims be rejected. 23
(2) Rebuttal based on ease of entry, economies of scale, or managerial effi-
ciencies should not be allowed, because these factors, although clearly rele-
vant to a correct evaluation of the competitive significance of a merger, are
intractable subjects for litigation.24
As it turns out, however, the question of what market power is excessive
must be assessed in relation to any benefits (economies) simultaneously con-
ferred by the objectionable practice or structure in question. Similarly, ease
of entry has become a central feature in the assessment of the competitive
significance of mergers. Antitrust enforcement has progressively made provi-
sion for both.
The strategic behavior area is one in which legal scholars more recently
have proposed highly circumscribed rules. Consider the following:
(1) In general, if greater than competitive profits are to be made in an in-
dustry, entry should occur whether the entrant has to come in at both
levels or not. I know of no theory of imperfections in the capital market
which would lead suppliers of capital to avoid areas of higher return to
22. It has been argued that "the economic background required for understanding antitrust is-
sues seldom requires detailed mastery of economic refinements." P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALY-
sis 4 (1967). This means, presumably, that the standard economic models of firms and markets
found in intermediate microtheory textbooks will suffice. I doubt it.
23. Blake & Jones, Toward A Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 422, 427
(1965). The Supreme Court was evidently persuaded when it pronounced that "[p]ossible econo-
mies cannot be used as a defense to illegality," Federal Trade Comm'n v. Proctor & Gamble Corp.,
386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967), as though the illegalities in question were well defined, both then and
forever.
24. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. Rnv. 282, 313 (1975).
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seek areas of lower return.25
(2) [L]ong run possiblities must be disregarded because they are intrinsi-
cally speculative and indeterminate. No suitable administrative rules could
be formulated to give them recognition. 26
(3) If there is any room in antitrust law for rules of per se legality, one
should be created to encompass predatory conduct. The antitrust offense of
predation should be forgotten.27
To be sure, market skeptics sometimes make bald claims of capital market
imperfections or other defects without empirical support. Market enthusi-
asts sometimes respond with equally bald claims of capital market efficacy.
Albeit understandable, such responses will not do. The issues to be ad-
dressed are (1) has there been a mistake in the use of competitive logic (e.g., a
failure to trace out the ramifications of the contracting process in its en-
tirety), or (2) has there been a mistake in assessing competitive efficacy.
As it turns out, transaction cost logic demonstrates that vertical integra-
tion can influence the cost of capital under carefully delimited circum-
stances,28 a consideration which is now admitted. 29 Moreover, numerous
studies have since demonstrated that timing can have real cost-bearing, and
therefore entry-deterring, consequences. 30 Furthermore, while the economic
analysis of strategic behavior has developed few operational rules, the pur-
ported irrationality of predatory pricing has been discredited. 31
The upshot is that, although inflexible legal rules proposed by lawyers fa-
cilitate administrability by disregarding economies, differential capital costs
and related costs of entry, long run possibilities and predatory conduct, and
by "dichotomizing" transactions, the possibility of serving the needs of ad-
ministrability under the aegis of more flexible legal process rather than legal
25. Bork, Vertical Integration and Competitive Processes, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MERGERS
139, 148 (F. Weston ed. 1969).
26. Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARV. L. REv. 891, 897
(1976).
27. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 263, 336-37
(1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Strategies] (footnote omitted).
28. 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICA-
TIONS 110-13 (1975) [hereinafter 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES]; Williamson,
Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L. REV. 284 (1977) [hereinafter
Williamson, Strategic Analysis].
29. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979). Indeed,
the merger guidelines now acknowledge this state of affairs. U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guide-
lines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1982).
30. See, eg., Spence, Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 BELL J. ECON. &
MGM'r. SCL 534 (1977); Dixit, The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence, 90 ECON. J. 95 (1980);
Katz & Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. EON.
822 (1986).
31. Kreps & Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982);
Milgrom & Roberts, Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. EcON. THEORY 280 (1982).
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rules warrants serious consideration. The needs of administrability would
arguably be served by introducing new legal rules with the following intro-
ductory statement: "Temporarily, pending further economic analysis and
deeper understanding of the economic institutions and practices in question,
the legal rule for dealing with this class of cases will be . . . ." Successive
refinements can thereafter be adopted. This more flexible approach is appro-
priate for antitrust administration when consensus is slow to form but suc-
cessive theoretical refinements play a critical role in judicial enforcement.
C. ADOPTING REFINEMENTS
Noneconomists frequently criticize economics because it works out of a
rationality framework, but this is rarely the problem. Rationality analysis is
really very elastic and can provide for any systematic feature. The main
"problems" with the economic approach are that it sometimes postulates hy-
pothetical ideals (e.g., costless compensation for injury), thereby making it
nonoperational, or that it sometimes focuses too narrowly, thereby omitting
or undervaluing important attributes.
Sociologists are frequent critics and often remark that the economic model
of the worker focuses too narrowly on the intended or immediate effects of
added incentives or controls to the neglect of unintended or secondary ef-
fects. Bureaucratic efforts to exercise control thus will often be deflected or
defeated by "dysfunctional" responses by the groups at which they are di-
rected.32 A more complete analysis of the issues requires a sociological per-
spective in which secondary effects are observed and interpreted.
The fact that incentives and controls give rise to originally unintended
consequences, however, does not imply that the economic approach is intrin-
sically unable to make allowance for sociological effects. To the contrary,
rationality analysis not only permits but demands that all significant, predict-
able secondary consequences be folded in, thus making the theory more com-
plete. Taking such secondary consequences into account from the outset will
avoid remediable errors.
The same rationale applies to administrability considerations. Puzzles and
tradeoffs frequently preoccupy economists to the neglect of administrability.
They study issues that are interesting for their own sake, even if the "com-
plexities" are poorly understood and well beyond the current capacity of the
legal system. Economists, however, can and have dealt with issues of ad-
ministrability where these needs are plainly salient. Moreover, improve-
ments on legal rules can and have been realized in the process.
32. See generally J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATION ch. 2 (1958).
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Peter Hutt's risk classification approach to food safety is illustrative. 33
Working from the premise that similar cases should receive similar treat-
ment, Hutt argues that "similar risks should be treated similarly."'3 4 Hutt
achieves simplification by employing three risk categories and measuring risk
entirely with reference to the probability of an unwanted outcome. As dis-
cussed elsewhere, this simplification (1) assumes that the loss associated with
an unwanted outcome is constant for all food items considered both within
and across risk classifications; (2) ignores benefits, including health benefits
associated with an item; and (3) assumes that all members of the consuming
population are identical.3 5 These are extreme simplifications and are fre-
quently contradicted by the data. They are, moreover, unnecessary-since
feasible administrable alternative procedures, as opposed to rules, for dealing
with food risks are available that work more systematically out of an eco-
nomic net benefit framework.36 These procedures-which I have referred to
as the risk classification decision tree37-distinguish among different uses and
users and examine the pertinent tradeoffs that apply to each. To be sure, the
decision process is somewhat more complicated as a result. Excesses of sim-
plication (rules as against procedures) frequently come, however, at a prohib-
itively high cost.
The approach to antitrust and economic regulation proposed herein rec-
ommends that administrability considerations be factored into the overall ra-
tionality analysis of the issues. The rules in force at each point in time would
thus be required to pass an administrability test, but provision would be
made to successively improve the rules upon refining the relevant theory and
our understanding of complex phenomena. 38 Rationality and the needs of
the legal process are thereby joined.
Donald Dewey's view of the role of economists in antitrust is broadly
consonant:
The important issues in the control of monopoly are 'economic' in the
sense that judges and administrators are compelled to make decisions in
the light of what they think the business world is 'really' like, and it is the
task of economists through research and reflection to provide them with an
increasingly accurate picture.39
33. Hutt, Unresolved Issues in the Conflict Between Industrial Freedom and Government Control
of Food Safety, 33 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 558 (1978).
34. It at 582.
35. Williamson, Saccharin: An Economist's View, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASis OF HEALTH AND
SAFETY REGULATION 131 (R. Crandall & L. Lave eds. 1981).
36. Id at 139-47.
37. Id at 142-50.
38. The recent paper by Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro illustrates complexities well beyond the
competence of current antitrust. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 30, at 835, 840.
39. D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW at i (1959) (emphasis added).
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I would merely add that economists can and should incorporate adminis-
trability considerations within an extended rationality framework. Incorpo-
ration is already occurring and explains the dramatic changes in antitrust
referred to above.40
II. ANTITRUST FILTERS
The purpose of a filter is to perform a sort between problematic and un-
problematic cases. I argue that market power is the only true filter and that
the four additional features introduced by Easterbrook are better regarded as
relevant factors rather than as filters. The relevant market power test is a
stringent one: market power should be present in sufficient degree to support
strategic behavior. Merely to exceed the strategic behavior threshold is not,
however, dispositive. Thus although all cases that fall below such a thresh-
old would be exempted, those cases that are above threshold would thereafter
be subject to an examination on the merits. The added factors to which Eas-
terbrook refers are germane to such an assessment.
Thus assume that the structural factors that would support strategic be-
havior have been exceeded, on which account the behavior in question might
possibly have strategic purpose and effect. The issue to be addressed is
whether nonstrategic explanations more plausibly explain this behavior.
Each of the factors to which Easterbrook refers are among those that would
help to inform such a comparative assessment on the merits. But merely to
satisfy any or even all of these four factors would not immunize a transac-
tion, which is what a filter does, thereby vitiating the need for a comparative
assessment.
That Easterbrook operates out of a nonstrategic antitrust tradition very
possibly explains our differences on this. If market power is relevant only as
it has a bearing on price, then strategic concerns can be dismissed and the
only question is what has been the effect on price. I urge that this is too
simple in circumstances where, to repeat, the strategic market power thresh-
old has been crossed.
It is instructive to reexamine each of the Easterbrook factors (filters) with
reference to this distinction.
A. INCENTIVE LOGIC
As Ronald Coase has observed, it is often easy and was once common to
1
40. That the 1982 merger guidelines (and successors thereto) differ from the 1968 version is at
least partly because of the insistent press of economizing reasoning and a growing appreciation for
the way the tradeoff calculus works. Had economists felt constrained by the purported limits of the
legal process, these and related developments would not have occurred. Therefore, today one would
not find mergers assessed with reference-to ease of entry, economies of scale, managerial efficiencies,
or related transaction cost features.
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ascribe anticompetitive purpose to virtually all forms of unfamiliar or non-
standard business behavior.41 The older and now discredited "leverage the-
ory" of tie-ins is one illustration.42 Those that subscribed to this theory had
simply failed to assess the contracting process in its entirety.
As it turns out, however, the intuition that informed leverage theory was
not totally mistaken. The problem was that this intuition was applied too
broadly and should have been reserved for circumstances of a strategic
kind.43 The same applies to other issues in which mistaken incentive logic is
claimed.
1. Myopic Logic
Predatory pricing complaints that implicate customers in predation some-
times fail because of myopic reasoning. As Easterbrook observes:
No predatory strategy can work without the [unwitting] cooperation of
consumers, who must desert the victim and buy from the predator even
though that causes them to pay a monopoly price later on. If consumers
are rational, they will not become instruments of their own harm. They
will, instead, buoy up the intended victim with long term contracts. 44
The relevant logic test is whether customers are too small individually to
influence competitive outcomes and thus will continuously accept the best
immediate terms offered heedless of the future, or whether customers are
large enough to recognize that they have a stake in influencing the quality of
competitive outcomes. Claims of predation that implicate large consumers in
their own demise fail the test of incentive logic and should be dismissed for
this reason. Firms do not rationally shoot themselves in the foot.45
The above argument is a variant of one made earlier by Richard Posner.
Referring to United Shoe's restrictive leasing practices, Posner argued that
"the customers of United would be unlikely to participate in a campaign to
strengthen United's monopoly position without insisting on being compen-
sated for the loss of alternative, and less costly (because competitive) sources
of supply."'46 Referring to many, rather than one or a few customers, the
Posner statement is stronger than the Easterbrook statement, but even the
Easterbrook version is overstated.
As Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton have recently shown, one can de-
41. Coase, supra note 2.
42. Posner, supra note 29.
43. Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, Program in Law and Economics,
Discussion Paper No. 4, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. (1985).
44. Easterbrook, Comments on "An Economic Definition of Product Innovation" in STRATEGY,
PREDATION, AND ANTrrRusT ANALYsiS 415, 418-19 (S. Salop ed. 1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook,
Comments].
45. See Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 1, at 25.
46. P- POSNER, ANTrrRuST LAW 203 (1976).
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vise contracts with cancellation penalties that deter but do not completely
block new entry.47 In effect, the incumbent seller and the single customer
form a coalition, the effect of which is to extract some of the rent that an
entrant with a superior low cost technology could otherwise earn upon entry.
To be sure, the model is highly "stylized" and makes no allowance for the
fact that the law in the United States maintains that the "central objective
behind the system of contract remedies is compensatory, not punitive."
48
Thus a liquidated damages clause is enforceable only if it is "reasonable in
the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficul-
ties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise ob-
taining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large damages is
void as a penalty."'49 Consequently, the application of the Aghion-Bolton
model would be restricted in any jurisdiction that limits liquidated dam-
ages.50 As a result, one must know the context to reach an informed result.
Nevertheless, Aghion and Bolton demonstrate that the normal or presumed
opposition of interests between single buyer and single seller does not pre-
clude bargaining whereby both can gain at the expense of potential lower
cost entrants.
2. Summary Judgment
Assume that the strategic threshold has been crossed and that, as in Mat-
sushita,51 a motion for summary judgment has been made. Since summary
judgments are to be assessed with reference to a theory of the case congenial
to the plaintiff, it would be a gross misuse of the incentive logic argument to
dismiss such a motion because a "more plausible" explanation of a non-
strategic kind has been asserted.
Not only would such a dismissal run contrary to the spirit of a summary
judgment proceeding, but it is rare that the differences between two plausible
scenarios will be so large and transparent that an easy choice between them
can be made without conducting a careful comparative examination of the
merits. I return to these issues in part III.B below.
47. Aghion & Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388 (1987).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 comment a (1979).
49. U.C.C. § 2-718(1).
50. Charges of irrationality have been lodged against imposing lawful limits on liquidated dam-
ages, since parties to a contract are best qualified to determine what contractual provisions meet
their contractual needs. It is now appropriate to entertain the possibility that the law on liquidated
damages is (at least partly) designed to deter strategic abuses of the contracting process.
Contrived cancellation of contract is another reason why the law might place limits on penalty
clauses. See generally 0. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 176-77; Clark-
son, Miller & Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 351,
366-72.
51. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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B. UNIFORMITY OF PRACTICES
Easterbrook advises that complaints about vertical market restrictions
should be dismissed without a review on the merits unless the practice is
adopted uniformly. This criterion has merit, and others previously suggested
a similar criterion.52 Easterbrook, however, goes beyond earlier arguments
and ascribes added power to this filter by expressing it in an extreme way: A
practice is unobjectionable unless everyone is implicated. Such a "uniform-
practice filter is exceptionally powerful. It screens out almost all challenges
to vertical practices."'53
Although Easterbrook correctly describes the effect of a uniform practice
filter, the more pertinent issue is whether adverse anticompetitive conse-
quences may exist in the absence of uniformity. If a dominant firm or all the
leading firms in an industry erect strategic entry impediments, the practice
should be subject to antitrust complaints even if certain small rivals on the
fringe do not participate. Also, one may need to distinguish between niche
markets serviced by small firms and main markets serviced by dominant
firms. If the practice in question effectively impedes entry into the main mar-
ket, then a problematic (mixed case) condition is arguably posed. Filtering
these cases out because of an absence of strict uniformity produces arbitrary
resolution of such cases.
More generally, although cases that fall below the threshold for strategic
market power might be regarded as more troublesome if uniform practices
are observed, the failure of strict uniformity does not immunize behavior that
falls within the strategic market power subset. Nonuniformity is not there-
fore a filter but is merely a factor to be assessed comparatively in these
circumstances. 54
C. OUTPUT CHANGES
Easterbrook contends that "[i]f arrangements are anticompetitive, the out-
put and market share of those using them must fall."' 55 He therefore advises
that "we... look at what happens when the manufacturer adopts the chal-
lenged practice .... If the manufacturer's sales rise, the practice confers
52. The fact that the contractual restraints employed by Schwinn were not used by other bicycle
manufacturers relieved concern of anticompetitive effect. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market
Restrictions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 953, 975-85 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson, Vertical Market
Restrictions].
53. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 1, at 30.
54. The key arguments advanced by the Government in Schwinn and a critique thereof appear in
Williamson, Vertical Market Restrictions, supra note 52, at 980-85. The principle issue in Schwinn
was "whether Schwinn, by itself or in conjunction with other large bicycle manufacturers, intro-
duced vertical restraints that placed customers or rivals at strategic disadvantage." Id. at 980-81
(footnote omitted).
55. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 1, at 31.
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benefits exceeding its costs." '56 However, inasmuch as price predation and
other forms of strategic behavior entail contingent output expansion,57 Eas-
terbrook's criterion is unhelpful within the market power subset to which
predation is plausibly ascribed.
Easterbrook's permissive interpretation of contingent output increases is
not unrelated to his earlier advice that the "antitrust offense of predation
should be forgotten."58 However, others may disagree,59 and defendants may
decide to pick and choose defenses: If one defense against predation is that
the output of the dominant firm has remained unchanged or been reduced in
the post-entry period,6° and if a second defense is that the output of the dom-
inant firm has risen,61 then anything goes. Lacking more substantial support,
the proposed output filter fails to discriminate among problematic practices.
Perhaps out of recognition that problematic practices require a longer pe-
riod for assessment, Easterbrook proposes judging challenged practices in
terms of survival in the following manner: If a firm or group of firms have
employed some arrangement continuously for five years and have not sub-
stantially lost market position, a challenge to the practice should be dis-
missed.62 Easterbrook does not provide the basis, however, for resolving
two-sided practices uniformly in favor of an efficiency hypothesis. Moreover,
his rule introduces strategic incentives to continue objectionable or problem-
atic practices even after expiration of entry-deterring effects, because prac-
tices otherwise subject to challenge will be dismissed by continuing them
beyond the five-year test interval (supported, perhaps, by price reductions in
the later part of the test period).
56. Id
57. Williamson, Strategic Analysis, supra note 28, at 292-95.
58. Easterbrook, Strategies, supra note 27, at 337.
59. Whereas economists who study strategic behavior frequently urge that "the nub of the prob-
lem... [is] the intertemporal aspect of the situation" (referring to nature of strategic decisions) the
advice of legal scholars in the area of strategic behavior appeals to static price theory. Baumol,
Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J.
1, 3 (1979). Moreover, the rules so derived are often defended on grounds that more complex
treatments of the issues are "nonadministrable."
As I have argued elsewhere, addressing strategic issues in a nonstrategic way does not reliably
yield an informed antitrust assessment. Williamson, Strategic Analysis, supra note 28. Janusz
Ordover and Garth Saloner concur. J. Ordover & G. Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and
Antitrust (C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, NYU 1987). They observe that the Areeda-
Turner marginal cost pricing test for predatory pricing is "based on static considerations . . .
[which] beg the question of how anticompetitive conduct is to be handled in a strategic context."
Id at 64-65.
60. Williamson, Strategic Analysis, supra note 28, at 297-300.
61. Easterbrook, Strategies, supra note 27, at 336.
62. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 1, at 33.
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D. PLAINTIFF IDENTITY
Easterbrook's last filter focuses on plaintiff identity and is based on the
following dichotomy: If a practice is collusive then rivals will benefit and
will not complain; if instead a practice is competitive, complaints by rivals
should be dismissed. Easterbrook mainly applies this filter to mergers, but a
variation on the filter is used to assess predatory pricing.
1. Mergers
In considering mergers Easterbrook states that "[t]he identity of the plain-
tiff is all the court needs to know .... [Antitrust suits brought] by a business
rival against a merger or joint venture should be dismissed. ' 63 Consumer-
originated suits aside, the antitrust enforcement agencies would thereby be
awarded exclusive control (sometimes referred to as a monopoly) over suits
involving either mergers or joint ventures.
Although I am likewise dismayed by the protectionist uses of private suits
and believe such suits should be regarded with grave skepticism, the antitrust
dichotomy from which Easterbrook works is too simplistic. In addition to
Type A (collusion enhancing) and Type B (efficiency enhancing) mergers, the
possibility of strategic effects (Type C) also exists.
There are at least two kinds of mergers with strategic purposes. First, the
merger of two adjacent firms in competitive space will avert head-to-head
competition. 4 Second, merged firms are better able to focus replies to new
entry and effect deterrence than if the two firms remained independent.
Ideally, the government should spot and challenge mergers that pose such
strategic concerns, since they would exceed the mergers guidelines limits that
are set strictly with reference to collusion concerns.65 It might therefore be
argued that no useful purposes are served by preserving private suits to chal-
lenge Type C mergers.
Suppose, however, that defects are present in the government's decision
processes. Initially, the government could fail to discover relevant competi-
tive features, because the government is less familiar with the relevant spatial
features of markets than rivals. However, inasmuch as Easterbrook counsels
that objections raised by rivals under Type A/Type B reasoning be regarded
as Type B evidence (the merger must have efficiency properties if rivals com-
plain), convincing the government that it has erred in its assessment presents
63. Id. at 36.
64. Williamson, Economies Revisited, supra note 7, at 735-36. Campbell, Spatial Predation and
Competition in Antitrust (Working Paper No. 27 presented at 1986 Law and Economics Program,
Stanford University).
65. Werden, Challenges to Horizontal Mergers by Competitors Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
24 AM. Bus. L.J. 213, 228-29 (1986).
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real difficulties. Thus, better that opposed rivals praise a merger than express
reservations!
Second, principled behavior within the antitrust enforcement agencies
notwithstanding, antitrust "deals and understandings" are nevertheless
made6 6 and become more likely in a regime where the government's deci-
sions on a merger are final. Absent a legal forum in which errors of the gov-
ernment are subsequently displayed, the "political antitruster" is secure
against review and reversal. 67
2. Predation
Easterbrook argues for dismissal of "predatory pricing suits brought by
firms that have not left the market. ' 68 In addition, he introduces a second
dichotomous choice model to support his recommendation.
Thus consider a two-period model (the Easterbrook system) in which pur-
portedly predatory practices undertaken in period one are judged by their
effect in period two. The dichotomy for assessing a practice is as follows: a
practice is judged to be a predatory success if the rivals at which it was di-
rected expire; if the rival firms survive, however, the predatory effort is
judged a failure. Since surviving firms "will collect the same price in period
two as the aggressor, '69 suits by surviving plaintiffs should be dismissed.
This convenient dichotomy is based on the assumption that predation is
designed to "kill a rival." 70 This form of predation is extreme, however, and
overlooks the possibility that discipline rather than destruction motivates
some (perhaps many) aggressive competitive moves.71 If punitive behavior
carries signals to the target and other firms in future periods, in other geo-
graphic areas, and in other lines of commerce, then the dichotomous kill/
survival model advocated by Easterbrook of predation oversimplifies.
Easterbrook and others can respond with some justification that our un-
66. Recall that Attorney General Herbert Brownell signed the 1954 consent decree between
AT&T and the government-which is consistent both with the proposition that the Antitrust Divf-
sion takes principled stands and with the proposition that politics and antitrust mix. Judge Harold
Greene discusses some of the politics of this case in his opinion in United States v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 136-38 (D.D.C. 1982) aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983). Congress passed the Tunney Act "to expose to public scrutiny and to a judicial
public interest determination the settlements negotiated between the Department of Justice and the
various antitrust defendants." Ia at 145.
67. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text (discussion of Whirlpool acquisition of Kitch-
enAid bears on this issue).
68. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 1, at 36-37.
69. Id at 37.
70. R. BoRx, THE ANTrrmusT PARADox 149 (1978).
71. Ordover and Saloner distinguish three ways in which a firm's conduct produces anticompeti-
tive effects: (1) it can deter potential rivals; (2) it can disadvantage or discipline actual rivals with-
out necessarily causing exit; and (3) it can destroy (cause a rival to exit). J. Ordover & G. Saloner,
supra note 59. Easterbrook considers only the last effect.
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derstanding of gaming responses, replies, reputation effects and the like is
very imperfect. Considerable piogress has nevertheless been made during
the past decade in addressing precisely these issues, 72 and more is in pros-
pect. If the world of antitrust is populated in part by Type C (strategic
mixed or complex) cases, it is folly to pretend otherwise.
This is not to say, however, that the law should attempt expressly to evalu-
ate Type C predation at this time. 73 The administrability concerns expressed
by Breyer and Bok may temporarily require addressing all predation cases in
a simplistic way. But as our understanding of predation increases, better
classification schemes should evolve. In awaiting these developments, claims
of predation are appropriately regarded with grave skepticism.74
Overall, the five-filter approach proposed by Easterbrook possesses rather
dubious properties. Although the first filter-market power--clearly sur-
vives, that is what antitrust has been working from all along. Each of the
other four filters that Easterbook introduces is more appropriately regarded
as a factor to be taken into account in assessing the comparative plausibility
of those antitrust complaints that fall within the strategic market power sub-
set. But neither individually nor collectively do these four added factors ex-
empt a case that poses genuine strategic concerns from being examined on
the merits.
72. One of the most widely cited studies on predation is that of Koller, The Myth of Predatory
Pricing-An Empirical Study, 4 ANTTRrusT L. & ECON. REv. 105 (1971). He employs a dichot-
omy that distinguishes between Type 1 predation when "the objective of the predator is to eliminate
a competitor" and Type 2 when the objective is to merge with or induce a competitor to collude. Id.
at 106. Type 3 is ignored. Type 3 refers to a situation in which the purpose is to discipline a rival
and transmit signals to this and other firms in future periods, in other geographic areas, and in other
lines of commerce. For example., Paul Milgrom and John Roberts argue as follows:
[P]redation emerges as a rational, profit maximizing strategy... not because it is directly
profitable to eliminate the particular rival in question, but rather because it may deter
future potential rivals. The mechanism by which this deterrent effect comes about is by
practicing predation the firm establishes a reputation as a predator.
Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 31, at 281 (emphasis added).
Gregory Werden nevertheless characterizes the Milgrom and Roberts article as one that demon-
strates "that predation can be rational... only under special conditions" and goes on to observe
that "more recent commentary has argued that predation is sufficiently rare and the potential ad-
verse effects of trying to prevent or punish it sufficiently great that predation should be per se legal."
Werden, supra note 65, at 229-30 (footnote omitted). The authorities, however, on which Werden
relies (Bork and Easterbrook) wrote before Milgrom and Roberts and do not address the reputation
rationality issues with which Milgrom and Roberts are concerned.
73. The most extensive, advanced, and ambitious effort to evaluate and provide enforcement
criteria to address anticompetitive exclusionary behavior is that of Thomas Krattenmaker and
Steven Salop. Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve
Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). However, just as Easterbrook's filter scheme can benefit
from academic critique, I would urge that the same is true for the Krattenmaker and Salop effort.
If their criteria emerge from such a critique unscathed, then we are in better shape than I indicate.
Be that as it may, the Krattenmaker and Salop analysis plainly advances the dialogue.
74. See 0. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INsrTuTIONS, supra note 3, at 378-82.
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My reservations with Easterbrook's filters notwithstanding, I nonetheless
am sympathetic to his main purpose. That is, to develop better criteria to
distinguish good and bad cases. To be sure, this can never be done perfectly.
Every effort to sort will carry two errors: "false positives," that is, cases that
are screened out but which have merit and should go forward; and "false
negatives," that is, cases that survive the fiters but lack merit and should
have been screened out. Each type of error carries a cost. Thus, the object is
to construct the filters so that expected social costs are minimized.75
It is possible, especially during this period of vigorous international com-
petition, that the costs of false positives are very low in relation to false nega-
tives. This is plainly Easterbrook's position when he argues that "errors on
the side of excusing questionable practices are preferable," 76 partly because
"the economic system corrects monopoly more readily than it corrects judi-
cial errors" and partly because "in many cases the costs of monopoly
wrongly permitted are small, while the costs of competition wrongly con-
demned are large."'77 Economies as an antitrust defense excepted,78 no one
has provided a demonstration that the cost differences are as Easterbrook
indicates. Easterbrook has an undischarged burden of proof that the cost of
false positives in the market power region where strategic behavior is impli-
cated is similarly low.
In the meantime, antitrust enforcement agencies and courts must decide
the cases as they arise. Although appealing to "hard-edged" legal rules re-
lieves strains on the enforcement process, today's false confidence is to-
morrow's precedent and becomes the basis for repeated error. Complex
cases that are imperfectly understood are better decided in a more modest
and provisional way. Working out of a legal process approach which invokes
temporary constraints but anticipates evolutionary refinements is therefore
proposed. The legal rule approach resolves too many of these issues
prematurely.79
III. STRATEGIC BEHAVIoR
Behavior by one firm that influences the choice set of another may be said
to have a strategic aspect. Such behavior is not by itself objectionable. It is
commonly the unavoidable consequence whenever the number of rivals is
few and the condition of entry is difficult. Behavior, however, that is focused
75. Cost assessment should include enforcement costs, a point made forcefully by Easterbrook.
Easterbrook, Comments, supra note 44, at 417, 425-27.
76. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 1, at 15.
77. Id
78. See supra note 7 (discussing parametric demonstration of cost differences where mergers
combine economies and monopoly power features).
79. Rey & Tirole, The Logic of Vertical Restraints, 76 AM. EcON. REv. 921, 937 (1936).
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and contingent is often highly problematic. Some egregious forms of strate-
gic behavior possess no redeeming social purpose.80
Much of the recent antitrust literature and court opinions are intended to
delimit strategic behavior that is considered to be unlawful. Concern over
strategic behavior has been progressively narrowed by (1) exempting all stra-
tegic behavior except strategic pricing from antitrust scrutiny; (2) restricting
attention within the strategic pricing subset to that which qualifies as preda-
tory; and (3) defining predatory pricing as that which would assuredly "kill"
an established rival if continued. It is easy to conclude from this exercise81
that strategic behavior poses few, if any, relevant antitrust concerns, since
pricing to kill established rivals borders on irrationality.
Claims of strategic behavior thus must be contrived or based on mistaken
incentive logic (e.g., failures to assess the underlying contracting process in
its entirety) and are properly exempt from antitrust concern. Exempting
strategic behavior from antitrust concern for such reasons is different, how-
ever, from delimiting antitrust enforcement because the legal process inade-
quately assesses relevant antitrust issues. Whereas the absence of antitrust
concern is settled once-and-for-all by the former, the latter does not contem-
plate such finality. To the contrary, as better economic models progressively
evolve and their ramifications are displayed, behavior once exempted because
of legal process concerns subsequently may be included in the antitrust en-
forcement scheme. Periodic reassessment that takes into account growing
knowledge of and experience with specific strategic phenomena is thus char-
acteristic of the legal process approach to strategic behavior. If and when the
expected net benefits of antitrust scrutiny of strategic behavior switch from
negative to positive (or the reverse), the ambit of antitrust must be redefined
accordingly.
Dispositive pronouncements of a once-and-for-all kind are thus supplanted
by evolutionary assessments of a state-of-the-art kind. As a result, the poten-
80. For an informed survey and discussion, see Ordover & Saloner, supra note 59.
81. Gregory Werden's recent piece on private antitrust suits is illustrative. Werden, supra note
65. He begins with reference to incipient predatory behavior but thereafter focuses almost entirely
on predatory pricing. Id. at 222. His statement, for example, that "[m]ost observers agree that
predation is unlikely under any set of circumstances" is supported almost exclusively by references
to predatory pricing. Id. at 230. His references to "predation cases" and the claim that "collusion is
concealable while predation is not" has a narrow (overt pricing) focus. Id at 230, 232.
Similarly the amicus brief filed by the government in Monfort supports its arguments that rivals
should be denied standing in merger cases entirely by references to predatory pricing as though
reference to predatory pricing exhausted the concerns. Brief for United States and the Federal
Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 21-25, Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of
Colo., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986) (No. 85-473) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
Although Robert Bork discusses a variety of possibly predatory practices, he focuses primarily
on predatory pricing. Others cite Bork as an authority for the proposition that predatory pricing is
designed to "kill" a rival. R. BORK, supra note 70, at 149-55.
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tial scope of strategic behavior is much wider than is admitted by the strate-
gic behavior/strategic pricing/predatory pricing/predatory "kill-the-rival"
pricing sequence referred to above.
Lest antitrust interest in strategic behavior potentially warranting future
enforcement be inadvertently foreclosed, a broad statement of the scope of
strategic behavior is arguably warranted. Such a broad statement of scope is
set out below. Note, however, that I do not claim that my classification of
strategic behavior is exhaustive or best; others have visited this territory
before.8 2
The distinction between strategic and operating decisions is usefully made
in studying firm behavior. Strategic decisions refer to overall product de-
velopment, marketing, and investment plans, while operating decisions con-
cern implementation. In the context of W. Ross Ashby's description of
ultrastable systems,83 the higher frequency (or short-run) dynamics are asso-
ciated with the operating parts, and the lower frequency (or long-run) dy-
namics are associated with the strategic system.84
All decisions with significant long-term importance carry strategic poten-
tial. The following list identifies some of the more important of these:
(1) pricing
(a) final product
(b) intermediate product (squeeze)
(2) product development









(c) asset attributes (kind and amount)
(5) government
(a) standards (product and environment)
82. See Salop, Introduction to Strategy, Predation, and Antitrust Analysis, in STRATEGY, PREDA-
TION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 1 (S. Salop ed. 1981) (discussing classification of strategic behav-
ior); Campbell, supra note 64 (same); Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 73 (same); Ordover &
Saloner, supra note 59 (same); Kreps & Spence, Modeling the Role of History in Industrial Organiza-
tion and Competition, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY MICROECONOMICS AND WELFARE 340 (G.
Feiwel ed. 1985) (same); Spence, Competition, Entry, and Antitrust Policy, in STRATEGY, PREDA-
TION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra, at 45 (same).
83. W.R. ASHBY, DESIGN FOR A BRAIN (1960).
84. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PROC. AM. PHIL. SoC'Y 467 (1962).
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Strategic behavior can either be preemptive or contingent. Focused and
contingent strategic behavior is especially troublesome,85 but that does not
mean that preemptive moves pose no problems. Pricing and marketing are
the areas where contingent actions (i.e., focused, responsive behavior
designed to defeat or discipline a rival; after such defeat the practice in ques-
tion will be discontinued) are especially likely. Unsurprisingly, most strategic
behavior complaints are lodged in these two areas.
Specific examples of strategic behavior that is problematic-not all of
which, however, are necessarily objectionable (considering our current lim-
ited understanding)--include:
(1) predatory pricing (which Kohler ascribes to American Tobacco in
1908 even under his narrow criteria);86
(2) price squeeze (which was part of the Alcoa complaint and has more
recently been imputed to Kaiser Aluminum); 87
(3) dumping;88
(4) contrived patent licensing;
(5) selective unbundling of services;
(6) efforts to confuse test marketing by rivals (as alleged in Purex v. Proc-
tor & Gamble); 9
(7) inducing the government to write contract specification to favor par-
ticular suppliers (which has occurred repeatedly with computer and commu-
nication equipment);
85. Williamson, Strategic Analysis, supra note 28; Baumol, supra note 59.
86. Kohler, supra note 72, at 114. For an additional example, see J. Ordover & G. Saloner, supra
note 59, at 14-15.
87. Columbia Metal Culvert v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978). Note that the economic logic of this case has been disputed by John
Wiley, Jr. Wiley, After Chicago: An Exaggerated Demise?, 1986 DuIn L.J. 1003. Wiley argues
that Kaiser purportedly "applied a classical price squeeze to pressure Columbia into an exclusive
dealing arrangement" Id. at 1010 (emphasis added). The Wiley position, however, is mistaken.
Kaiser applied a price squeeze when Columbia refused to sell out to Kaiser. The merger of Colum-
bia and Kaiser would facilitate uncontested aluminum culvert fabrication by Kaiser. The success of
Kaiser's squeeze required (1) that other suppliers of aluminum culvert coil (of which Kaiser was the
largest) follow Kaiser's pricing lead, and (2) that Columbia would be unable to match the low bids
of the rival fabricator that Kaiser created and supported to contest the Columbia market.
88. See generally J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1923) (dis-
cussing problems posed by strategic behavior of dumping).
89. 419 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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(8) using high and uniform wages to deter rivalry by labor intensive firms
(as alleged in the Pennington case);
(9) vertical integration with capital market deterring effects (as in color
film processing);
(10) the strategic preemption of a critical resource (a concern of the USFL
regarding access to TV networks vis-a-vis the NFL);
(11) using the regulatory process to defeat entry (as in the repeated pleas
by AT&T to protect "system integrity" against foreign attachments);
(12) use of local government controls-inspection, local content and other
requirements, certification, and the like-to favor incumbents (as is repeat-
edly claimed by those attempting to sell into Japanese markets); and
(13) the creation of closed contracting networks and hubs that resist inva-
sion (as discussed by Levine in connection with airline deregulation). 90
I have urged elsewhere in my discussions of strategic and predatory behav-
ior that severe structural preconditions must be satisfied before a potential
antitrust concern is seriously posed. High concentration coupled with high
barriers to entry are needed.91 Paul Joskow and Alvin Klevorick in one anal-
ysis, and Janucz Ordover and Robert Willig in another analysis agree and
propose a "two tier test" for predation.92 Recall that Easterbrook's first filter
is a structural one (i.e., market structure). Campbell also states that sub-
markets must be defined with care in discussing spatial competition. 93 As-
suming that adequate provision is made for Campbell's point, the subset of
industries where problematic strategic behavior is most apt to be located in-
cludes the following: (1) the sitting monopolist/duopolist situation; (2) regu-
lated monopolies; (3) dominant firm industries; and (4) collusive oligopolies
(especially those William Fellner referred to as "Case 3 oligopoly,' 94 where
an outside agency (e.g., a union) enforces collective action).95
90. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public Pol-
icy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393 (1987).
91. Williamson, Strategic Analysis, supra note 28, at 292-93.
92. Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213,
225-31 (1979); J. Ordover & R. Willig, Perspective on Mergers and World Competition (Economic
Research Report No. 85-11, N.Y.U. 1985).
93. See Campbell, supra note 64 (discussing need to clearly define submarkets of spatial competi-
tion to be analyzed properly).
94. See generally W. FELLNER, COMPETITIoN AMONG THE FEW (1949).
95. Firms outside this group still may take strategic actions that adversely affect specific rivals.
But the added question must be asked as to whether firms outside the group can recoup. "Mistaken
predation" is that for which expected recoupment cannot be projected ex ante. Note that mere
failure to recoup ex post does not demonstrate that predatory designs were mistaken ex ante. Eas-
terbrook's view that only ex post successful predation is unlawful is a further illustration of "over-
delimiting" the relevant set. See Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, supra note 1, at 32-33 (source
in which Easterbrook makes mentioned argument).
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IV. RECENT ANTITRUST SUITS
This part examines three recent antitrust suits. The first involves a private
suit challenging the acquisition of KitchenAid by the Whirlpool Corpora-
tion.96 Here I illustrate my concern with proposals to exclude rivals from
bringing suit by evaluating the FTC's earlier disposition of this merger. The
second case is Matsushita,97 where I question the economic analysis used by
the majority on the Supreme Court. The last case is Monfort,98 where I ex-
amine the amicus brief by the government asking that rivals be precluded
from challenging mergers.
A. WHIRLPOOL-KITCHENAID
Whirlpool's acquisition of KitchenAid is of interest because it demon-
strates (1) the propensity to classify mergers as Type A (collusion enhancing)
or Type B (cost reducing) to the exclusion of Type C (strategic); (2) the
readiness with which the FTC accepts cosmetic divestitures as curative; (3)
the propensity of the courts to dismiss strategic concerns as "speculative";
and (4) the bases upon which economies are claimed. I consider each of
these seriatim.
1. The Naive Dichotomy
A complaint by rivals that a merger will have anticompetitive effects
should be regarded with suspicion. Such complaints often reflect a concern
not with competition (a process) but with competitors (themselves). If a
merger has market power effects to which price increases are ascribed (a
Type A merger), then rivals will benefit. Therefore, private complaints will
not appear in a Type A merger. If the merger is the source of prospective
cost savings with attendant price reductions (a Type B merger), then the
public stands to benefit. Private suits merely serve protectionist purposes in
Type B circumstances.
This convenient dichotomy is sometimes used as the basis for adjudicatory
bodies to disallow merger complaints brought by rivals. It ignores, however,
a third possibility-that is, that the price effects could be localized rather
than spread across all market segments and that merged firms could strategi-
cally occupy market niches, resist intrusion, and discipline rivals more effec-
tively than if they were to remain independent. The omission of relevant
96. White Consol. Indus. v. Whirlpool Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ohio 1985). I served as
an economic consultant to and expert witness for White Consolidated Industries in its challenge to
this merger.
97. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
98. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986).
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alternatives is an old antitrust gambit,99 but antitrust enforcement is the
poorer when relevant Type C alternatives are suppressed or ignored.
Ronald Coase took exception with pre-1970 antitrust enforcement because
it was informed by an excessively narrow conception of the economic pro-
cess. "Applied price theory" was used in the 1960s to ascribe monopoly pur-
pose to many beneficial nonstandard practices. 1° This same framework is
now employed to exclude the Type C alternative, because strategic behavior
has no place within the applied price theory tradition or at least within the
"die-hard Chicagoan" variant thereof.101
Aware that the FTC was working out of a Type A/Type B merger
calculus, White Consolidated Industries (which was a "white goods" rival to
Whirlpool and more distant rival in quality space to KitchenAid) neverthe-
less asked the Commission to enjoin the acquisition of KitchenAid by Whirl-
pool. White Consolidated propounded the following reasons for enjoining the
acquisition:
(1) The "curative" divestiture whereby Whirlpool had purportedly dis-
posed of the dishwasher business of KitchenAid (which is where the main
competitive overlap was concentrated) was cosmetic.
(2) KitchenAid occupied a high price/quality niche in the dishwasher
market and displayed an interest (as revealed in its planning documents) in
expanding its market presence. Whirlpool occupied a middle price/quality
dishwasher position region. The merger of KitchenAid and Whirlpool not
only removed the prospective head-to-head competition, but a combined
Whirlpool-KitchenAid would be better able to resist encroachments into the
upper end of the market by other firms (such as White) than if Whirlpool
and KitchenAid were independent.
(3) Redeeming economies did not justify the merger.
2. Curative Divestiture
The main competitive overlap between Whirlpool and KitchenAid was in
the dishwasher business where market shares (even without reference to mar-
ket niches) exceeded the merger guidelines. Whirlpool proposed to rectify
this problem by selling the KitchenAid dishwasher plant to Emerson Elec-
tric. The contract whereby curative divestiture was to be accomplished pro-
vided that:
(1) Emerson would manufacture KitchenAid dishwashers for sale by
Whirlpool under the KitchenAid name and could produce and sell addi-
99. See my discussion of the mistaken dichotomous reasoning employed by the Government in
Schwinn, supra notes 52, 54.
100. See generally Coase, supra note 2.
101. The term "die-hard Chicagoan" originates with Richard Posner. See Posner, supra note 24.
He uses the term to characterize those who in effect reduce strategic behavior to the null set.
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tional dishwashers only under design restrictions and severe marketing
constraints.
(2) Whirlpool was in a position to preempt production from the Emerson
plant.
(3) The Emerson contract was, in effect, a supply agreement that guaran-
teed to Emerson a twenty percent after tax rate of return on invested capital.
Whirlpool could terminate the contract at the end of five years by buying the
plant back from Emerson for the unexpired portion of Emerson's original
investment. During the supply interval, capital enhancement could only be
done with Whirlpool's consent. Emerson agreed to annual audits by Whirl-
pool of fixed and variable costs.
The Whirlpool-Emerson transaction is not simple. The transaction joins a
banking function (Emerson buys the dishwasher plant) with rate of return
regulation (Emerson receives a guaranteed rate of return but is subject to
investment and audit restraints). The obvious purpose of the sale was to
sanitize a merger while leaving Whirlpool in effective control of critical
assets.
The FTC glossed over the substance of the sale in its initial review of the
merger. Moreover, even after these contractual features were expressly
called to the Commission's attention, the merger was approved by the FTC
with the contractual features in place.
White Consolidated thereafter brought suit in federal district court to en-
join the merger.102 The court examined the conditions of the supply agree-
ment and found them "sufficiently inhibitive of Emerson's ability to compete
in the market that Emerson will not act as a post-transaction check on
Whirlpool and will not in any way make up for the loss of KitchenAid." 0 3
Specifically, the court held that the supply agreement would "so hinder
Emerson that Whirlpool will effectively control Emerson's level of produc-
tion." 1° The court therefore granted a preliminary injunction against the
acquisition but gave Whirlpool the option of amending the merger agreement
to remove the objectionable contracting features. Whirlpool promptly re-
moved the objectionable features and the preliminary injunction was vacated.
I submit that a better, or at least more informed, antitrust result would not
have occurred if the FTC's decision regarding this merger had been final.
This should give pause to those who would prohibit private antitrust suits.
The option to ask for court-ordered relief not only permits challenge to de-
fective decisions by the antitrust enforcement agencies and possible correc-
102. White ConsoL Indus., 612 F. Supp. at 1009.
103. Id at 1029.
104. Id
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tion, but places the enforcement agencies under greater pressure to reach
decisions on the merits in the first place.
3. Strategic Concerns
Whether or not this is a Type C merger in which the head-to-head compe-
tition of the merging firms had strategic significance depends on whether the
upper end of the dishwasher market constituted a meaningful submarket.
This is a difficult question and was never determined. Strategic considera-
tions become important if one assumes that spatial considerations apply and
that this is a meaningful submarket.
Although it is common to argue that strategic abuses can be dealt with
directly if and when they occur,105 the fact remains that our capacity to eval-
uate strategic abuses is very primitive. Consequently, earlier advice that the
merger statutes be viewed to foreclose strategic hazards warrants renewed
consideration. The merger guidelines do not presently contemplate such
uses. 106
4. Economies
Whirlpool's keen interest in this acquisition turned on the valie that it
placed in the KitchenAid brand name. Possibly this was because Whirlpool
could realize greater real economic value than KitchenAid with the Kitch-
enAid name. The name connoted high quality and would allow Whirlpool to
sell a broader line of high quality goods in larger volumes. But possibly the
value realization that Whirlpool had in mind was more problematic: Whirl-
pool planned to attach the KitchenAid name to Whirlpool appliances after
making only cosmetic adjustments.
Carl Shapiro's treatment of "milking a reputation" in selling products to
consumers who initially overestimate quality is pertinent. The optimal strat-
egy in "milking a reputation" entails starting with a high price and progres-
sively reducing it until "the price and quantity revert to the same levels that
would prevail under perfect information and remain there indefinitely."1 0 7
Although many Whirlpool planning documents supported the cosmetic
hypothesis, the defendant understandably presented the real value hypothesis
to the FTC and the court. A new marketing concept was introduced for this
105. Werden, supra note 65, at 232.
106. Id at 226-29.
107. Shapiro, Optimal Pricing of Experience Cods, 14 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScL 497, 504
(1983). If Whirlpool could realize gains from strategically devaluing the KitchenAid brand name,
one might ask why KitchenAid could not have pursued a similar strategy (e.g., by acquiring Whirl-
pool or White or simply procuring inferior products and attaching its brand name). Asymmetries
between Whirlpool and KitchenAid-in terms of strategic competence, knowledge of the market,
and preexisting but imperfectly transferable organizational competence (including management
team features) generally-arguably existed and favored the Whirlpool initiative.
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purpose, whereby value was ascribed to "white goods-brand name."10 The
court did not rule on either of these possibilities. However, when considering
a conflict between expressed intention, as disclosed in planning documents,
against the hypothetical benefits of a novel marketing theory, there is much
to be said for the former. The FTC was nonetheless impressed by the latter.
B. MATSUSHITA
The Matsushita case dragged on for over a dozen years. Although a com-
plex case, the core economic theory espoused by the plaintiff apparently was
that Japanese television manufacturers engaged in collusion and dumping. 109
The Japanese firms had a protected home market and sold abroad on terms
that were held to be predatory. The general theory appears to have been that
set out many years ago by Jacob Viner: "once monopoly control has been
achieved in the domestic market, it may pay, if domestic orders do not fully
occupy the productive facilities, to bid for orders in other markets at prices
lower than those exacted at home." 110 There are several possibilities:
A producer may engage in export dumping primarily with a view to main-
taining full production during a period of depression in the domestic mar-
ket, but he may at the same time deliberately manage his dumping so that
it will inflict as much injury as possible upon his foreign competitors.
Moreover, the predatory dumper may not expect that he will succeed in
wholly eliminating the competitors against whom he is dumping, but he
may be content if his dumping so weakens them that they will thereafter
refrain from contesting his prices or from extending their activities into his
special markets.111
The study of strategic behavior has since been elaborated to include the
learning curve benefits of cumulative production,11 2 the attributes of invest-
ment, 113 techniques for raising rivals' costs, 114 strategic reputation effects, 115
and even international strategic features.1 16 However, the basic argument is
the one stated by Viner. The plausibility of such an argument must be evalu-
ated in the context of Matsushita.
The Supreme Court, however, did not evaluate the plausibility of the case
108. Benjamin Klein introduced the concept and argued its antitrust relevance to the FTC and
district court.
109. In re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d 238, 251 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd and remanded
sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
110. J. VINnR, supra note 88, at 94.
111. Id at 122.
112. Spence, supra note 30.
113. Dixit, supra note 30.
114. Salop & Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. Rnv. 267 (1983).
115. Kreps & Wilson, supra note 31; Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 31.
116. Ordover & Willig, supra note 92.
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by assessing the plaintiff's theory.' 1 7 Rather, the Court examined the plausi-
bility of the defendant's case. In effect, the Court embraced the Easterbrook
scenario, which is as follows:
The plaintiffs maintain that for the last fifteen years or more at least ten
Japanese manufacturers have sold TV sets at less than cost in order to drive
United States firms out of business. Such conduct cannot possibly produce
profits by harming competition, however. If the Japanese firms drive some
United States firms out of business they could not recoup. Fifteen years of
losses could be made up only by very high prices for the indefinite future.
(The losses are investments, which must be recovered with compound in-
terest.) If the defendants should try to raise prices to such a level, they
would attract new competition. There are no barriers into electronics, as
the proliferation of computer and audio firms shows. 118
The strategic model on which Easterbrook relies for his assessment is not
expressly stated. He ascribes very severe purposes (drive rivals out) rather
than more limited ones (discipline). Recoupment is examined not in ex ante
respects, but only in ex post terms. He infers conditions about entry into
television manufacturing and marketing from the "proliferation of computer
and audio firms." He questions the force of plaintiffs' case and suggests that
"we are left with the more plausible inference that the Japanese firms...
were just engaged in hard competition."'1 19 However, others may ask for the
examination of alternative models and for a more complete parameterization.
Note that admissible evidence must be construed in the light most
favorable to the non-movant in motions for summary judgment. Therefore,
evidence should be viewed most favorable to respondent (the United States
firms). 120 The majority in Matsushita, however, selectively processed the evi-
117. Perhaps this is too strong. The Court states that "the conduct in question consists largely of
(i) pricing at levels that succeeded in taking business away from [U.S. firms], and (ii) arrangements
that may have limited [Japanese firms'] ability to compete with each other.. . ." Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 (1986). This analysis is consonant with the
Viner dumping/predation scenario. But rather than assess whether dumping/predation was pres-
ent, the Court asserts: "This conduct suggests either that [Japanese firms] behaved competitively,
or that [Japanese firms] conspired to raise prices." Id (emphasis in original). The Court is evi-
dently taken with Type A/Type B thinking. In any event, no serious examination of the Viner
scenario is anywhere attempted.
118. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 1, at 26-27.
119. Id. at 27.
120. The plaintiff is constrained to (1) choose his theory of the cases from an admissible subset,
and (2) demonstrate that the data on which he relies support the complaint. Therefore, discredited
theories, such as old style "leverage theory," cannot be invoked. However, inasmuch as dumping
has not similarly been discredited, only the data can warrant the dismissal of such a complaint.
Moreover, simply because dumping was unsuccessful does not prove that it was never tried or
that no injury occurred. Thus attempted dumping may be defeated because it was misconceived
from the outset; that is, the requisite preconditions were not satisfied. Since mistaken predation will
be rare or at least not repeated, and since claims of predation are easy to register and hard to
evaluate, all predation claims that fail the structural test for preconditions might be disallowed. 0.
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dence through a lens unfavorable to the United States firms. Unsurprisingly,
it found that the conspiracy was "implausible" because the Japanese firms
had "no motive to enter into the alleged conspiracy."' 12 1
Although "no motive" is surely too strong, I likewise view the claims by
the United States firms in this case with grave reservations (partially because
I, like many other economists, have grave doubts about the efficacy of con-
spiracy.122 But the ability to support conspiracy may differ between Japanese
and domestic firms, some of which differences are manifest in the record). If
settled legal doctine is to be respected, the minority opinion in Matsushita
adheres more closely to the circumspect standards that one expects in sum-
mary judgment proceedings. 23
C. MONFORT
The Supreme Court rejected claims alleging injury to competition brought
by Monfort. Monfort opposed the merger of the second and third largest
beef packing and fabricating firms in the United States (which, when com-
bined, would occupy a twenty-one percent market share).124 Monfort's argu-
ments in opposition to the merger have a strongly protectionist character. 125
My concern with this case is not with the Supreme Court opinion, but with
the amicus brief filed by the Justice Department and the FTC. The brief
argues that:
Where a plaintiff challenges an acquisition on the ground that it creates a
possibility offuture predatory pricing, he does not allege a "real and imme-
diate threat" of antitrust injury to himself unless, at a minimum, he alleges
that the defendant will dominate the post-acquisition market .... Excel's
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTrUrIONS, supra note 3, at 382. I nevertheless understand that other
students of predation could argue for punishment of all forms of egregious predation, mistaken
predation included. Firms really do make significant strategic errors (witness Ford Motor Co. in
the 1920s and General Motors in the 1980s). Mistaken predation is not exempt. Id. at 111.
The more troublesome case occurs where the requisite preconditions are satisfied, yet focused
strategic behavior fails because of unanticipated developments (changes in demand, defections from
the agreement, etc.). The Easterbrook 20/20 hindsight test would excuse all predation efforts that
fail. Real damages and unambiguous intent notwithstanding, muggers whose victims survive go
free.
121. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 595.
122. 0. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INsTrrUTIONS, supra note 3, at 277-79; 0. WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 28, at 238-47.
123. The dissenting opinion was written by Justice White, who at one juncture observes that "[i]f
the court intends to give every judge hearing a motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case
the job of determining if the evidence makes the inference of conspiracy more probable or not, it is
overturning settled law." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 572.
124. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986).
125. The case illustrates some of the speculative hazards that unavoidably appear if strategic
behavior complaints are presented at a hearing.
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post-acquisition share of the market would have been less than 21%, which
would not even make it the largest firm in the market.
While the foregoing considerations are sufficient to decide the case, there
are important reasons why the Court should take the further step of ruling
that an allegation of threatened future predatory pricing is never sufficient
to give a competitor standing to challenge an acquisition. Injunctive ac-
tions brought by competitors on a "predatory pricing" theory will often
stifle precompetitive acquisitions, and they are likely to do so before the
matter can reach this Court; such anticipatory lawsuits are not necessary to
combat predatory behavior, which can be remedied if and when it actually
occurs. In light of (1) a competitor's strong incentive to seek to scuttle a
procompetitive acquisition and the high risk that a court challenge will do
so, (2) the remoteness of the possibility that an acquisition will lead to
predatory pricing, and (3) the ability of any competitor later faced with
actual predatory pricing to invoke the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, the
purposes of the antitrust laws would be best served by denying competitors
standing to challenge acquisition on the basis of predatory pricing
theories.
126
The brief further urges that:
[A]n antitrust complaint that can withstand a motion to dismiss is often
not hard to frame, and the mere pendency of lawsuits will often be fatal to
future procompetitive acquisitions before they can reach this Court. Al-
lowing competitors' suits to proceed on a predatory pricing theory thus
invites competitor suits that will frustrate procompetitive acquisitions and
"chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect."' 127
Although the amicus brief raises legitimate issues, it is overreaching in the
following respects: (1) the efficacy of section 2 challenges to predatory pric-
ing is seriously to be doubted; (2) giving the government a monopoly over
merger cases invites careless disposition; and (3) strategic behavior spans a
much wider class of events than is comprehended by predatory pricing.
That the Supreme Court declined the invitation to prohibit private suits at
this time, albeit on different grounds than those stated here,' 28 is encourag-
ing. A symmetrical assessment of all of the effects, including those to which
I refer above, is needed before the result requested by the government is
warranted.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Delimiting antitrust is a commendable objective, but delimitation can be
126. Amicus Brief, supra note 81, at 10.
127. Id at 22.
128. The Court observes that "[ilt would be novel indeed for a court to deny standing to a party
seeking an injunction against threatened injury merely because such injuries rarely occur." Monfort,
107 S. Ct. at 495.
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taken to excess. Dichotomous reasoning-by artificially classifying mergers
or predation as Type A/Type B-is too simple. Efforts to derogate strategic
behavior have likewise been overdone. Moreover, legal rules proclaimed in
the name of administrability can come at an unacceptably high price:
To insist that we understand matters on which we are truly ignorant can
only lead to erratic, controverted decisions and to opinions which lack the
reasoned logic on which respect for law depends. Dismissed with quick
assertions, these troublesome questions may fail to evoke the continued in-
quiry which they deserve, so that mistaken notions may persist, entombed
in the law, beyond the day when fresher doctrines could lay them suitably
to rest. 129
Antitrust in the 1960s was overconfident and even shrill.130 This has for-
tunately been redressed. To go further by "balancing" the excesses of mo-
nopoly reasoning in that era with excesses of competitive reasoning today
does not, however, produce a better result.
The approach to antitrust enforcement proposed herein (1) regards econo-
mizing as the main case, (2) takes strategic behavior in all of its forms seri-
ously, and, provided that due allowance has been made for the operational
infirmities of the enforcement process, (3) expressly introduces strategic ex-
ceptions to the main case provided that (a) the requisite structural precondi-
tions have been satisfied and (b) the supporting strategic logic withstands
scrutiny. The inhospitality excesses of the 1960s are avoided by treating
economizing as the main case. Die-hard Chicagoan excesses are similarly
avoided by insisting that strategic hazards of subtle and even poorly under-
stood kinds be admitted, added complexities notwithstanding, rather than
being arbitrarily dismissed through the use of artificial dichotomies or
otherwise.
The limitations of the flexible legal process method are nonetheless real
and need to be respected. Provision for these are made by insisting that hy-
pothetical gains be functionally implemented. Lags between the develop-
ment of new theory and efforts to adopt these refinements into the
enforcement process therefore occur routinely. But while antitrust enforce-
ment works out yesterday's theory, this is done with a keen eye to recent and
prospective developments.
Those with a strong predilection for certitude or those who believe that the
state of yesterday's theory is fully adequate will find this evolutionary recipe
unacceptable. Let them reflect, however, on what would have happened had
129. Bok, supra note 20, at 228.
130. Justice Potter Stewart, in a dissenting opinion in 1966, expressed his frustration as follows:
the "sole consistency that I can find... in [merger] litigation under Section 7 [is that] the Govern-
ment always wins." United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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antitrust enforcement been frozen in the 1960s mold. And let them further
reflect on the robust state of industrial organization.
Thus, whereas industrial organization was thought to have languished as
recently as sixteen years ago, 31 today's verdict is that industrial organization
is alive and well and is the queen of applied microeconomics. Antitrust en-
forcement has been and will continue to be the beneficiary.
131. Victor Fuchs asked in his foreword to a recent National Bureau of Economic Research
publication "whither industrial organization?" to which he responded that "all is not well in this
once flourishing field." Fuchs, Foreword to POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION at xv (V.R. Fuchs ed. 1972).
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